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Abstract 
The sceptical inference relation associated with a Poole system without constraints is known to 
have a simple semantic representation by means of a smooth order directly defined on the set of 
interpretations associated with the underlying language. Conversely, we prove in this paper that, 
on a finite propositional language, any preferential inference relation defined by such a model is 
induced by a Poole system without constraints. In the particular case of rational relations, the 
associated set of defaults may be chosen to be minimal; it then consists of a set of formulae, totally 
ordered through classical implication, with cardinality equal to the height of the given relation. 
This result can be applied to knowledge representation theory and corresponds, in revision theory, 
to Grove’s family of spheres. In the framework of conditional knowledge bases and default 
extensions, it implies that any rational inference relation may be considered as the rational closure 
of a minimal knowledge base. An immediate consequence of this is the possibility of replacing 
any conditional knowledge base by a minimal one that provides the same amount of information. 
@ 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
In [ 121, a variation on Reiter’s default logic [ 141 was presented, leading to the 
following notion: a Poole system is a pair (A, K) of sets of sentences, called respectively 
the set of “defaults” and the set of “constraints” of the system. Such a system may be 
used to determine the nonmonotonic consequences of a premiss LY, assuming as true 
the maximal subsets of A that are consistent with cy and K. As shown by Makinson 
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[ 11, Section 3.31, Poole’s original liberal conception of the “extension family function” 
associated with the pair (A, K) can be modified to a sceptical approach, providing a 
preferential inference relation when the Poole system is one “without constraints”, i.e. 
when its set K of constraints is empty. Such a Poole system can be identified with a set 
of prerequisite-free normal defaults in the sense of Reiter, and the associated preferential 
inference relation then corresponds to the sceptical Reiter extension of A. It was noticed 
by Makinson [ 111 and Poole [ 131 that the preferential inference relation associated with 
such a Poole system can be represented by a special kind of preferential model, where 
the set of states is the set of all worlds. Makinson [ 111 mentioned that the converse of 
this property was not settled, and conjectured that it may hold. 
We shall give an affirmative answer to this conjecture for languages that are logi- 
cally finite, and prove that any consistency-preserving preferential relation dejked by 
an injective model is the inference relation associated with a Poole system without con- 
straints. Thus, preferential reasoning, when determined by a preferential injective model, 
is (at least in the finite case) essentially the same as default reasoning: the logic of 
any agent using injective preferential reasoning is fully determined by an implicit set of 
basic defaults. 
This result holds in particular for rational reasoning, as it is known that rational 
inference relations may always be defined by means of ranked injective models [2]. It 
follows that any consistency-preserving rational inference relation defined on a logically 
finite language is induced by a Poole system without constraints. This Poole system 
is not uniquely determined, and two sets of defaults D and D’ may induce the same 
inference relation, but among the different sets of defaults that induce a given rational 
inference relation, one of them, called the characteristic set of the relation, satisfies some 
interesting properties: it is minimal, simple to describe, and its elements are linearly or- 
dered through classical implication. The characteristic set of a rational inference relation 
therefore appears to be a most useful tool for the study of this relation: in particular, if 
we denote by Si, . . . ,a,, the elements of this set, with Si+i (classically) implied by Si 
for i < n, the given relation simply reads “a b p iff there exists an index i such that 
Si is consistent with cx but inconsistent with CY A +“. This observation explains, in the 
perspective of Poole systems, some classical results established in revision theory by 
Grove [ 71 and Linstrom and Rabinowicz [ lo]. Moreover, it leads to some interesting 
applications in the field of conditional knowledge bases and default extensions: thus 
we prove that any consistency-preserving rational inference relation may be considered 
as the rational closure of a minimal conditional base, and we show how to explicitly 
determine this base. 
This paper is self-contained and is organized as follows: in Section 2, we recall 
the definitions and main properties of preferential inference relations. Poole systems 
are introduced in Section 3. There, we examine Makinson’s conjecture and show that, 
while not true in general, this conjecture holds in the case of finite languages. The 
section concludes with some considerations on the dynamics of Poole systems: the set 
of defaults of a Poole system, analyzed as a belief base, may be revised or updated, and 
this affects the behaviour of the associated inference relation. Section 4 is the central 
part of this paper, and is devoted to the case of rational inference relations and their 
characteristic sets. Section 5 is an application of the results of Section 4 to some aspects 
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of knowledge representation theory concerning conditional bases extension. We conclude 
in Section 6. 
2. Background 
We denote by L: a set of well-formed formulae over a set of atomic propositions, closed 
under the classical propositional connectives 7, A, V, -+ and c--f. When there are only 
finitely many atomic propositions, the language is said to be logically finite. Semantics 
is provided by the set W of all assignments of truth values to the propositional variables. 
Elements of W will be referred to as worlds and the satisfaction relation between a world 
m and a formula (Y is defined as usual and written m k a. Thus m k (Y V /? iff m + LY 
or m k /3, and m /= TX iff it is not the case that m j= a. 
For every subset A of L, we write m /= A iff m satisfies all the elements of A. The 
set of formulae of L satisfied by a world m will be denoted by 11121. 
The cla.ssical consequence operation attached to C and W will be denoted by Cn: 
for any subset A of C, Cn(A) is the set of all formulae LY of L such that m k LY for 
all worlds m that satisfy A. Given a subset A of C, we say that A is consisfent iff 
Cn(A) # C or, equivalently, iff there exists a world m such that m satisfies A. The set 
A is said to be consistent with the set B iff AU B is a consistent set. We write Cn( A, B) 
for Cn(A IJ B), Cn(Lu) for Cn({n}) and (Y k /3 for p E Cn(cu). 
2.1. Prefeirential inference relations 
Following Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [ 81, we call preferential inference relation 
on L: a relation b that satisfies the following rules: 
Reflexivity. (Y k cr. 
Left Logical Equivalence. If Cn( a) = Cn( /3) and a k y, then /3 k y. 
Right Weakening. If p E Cn(cr) and y b CY, then y b p. 
Cut. If a A p k y and a t_ p, then LY b y. 
Or. If a bd y and p k y, then (Y V /I k y. 
Cautious Monotonicity. If LY b /3 and a k y, then a A p k y. 
Given such a relation, we shall denote by Cl_ (a)-or C(a) when there is no 
ambiguity--the set of all k-consequences of a formula a, that is the set of all p’s 
such that I2 k p. We will indifferently refer to “the inference relation k” or to the 
“inference relation C”. The above rules imply that for any preferential inference relation 
C, the sets C (cu) are closed with respect to Cn, that is Cn[ C( cu) ] = C (cu) for all 
formulae cr. An inference relation C is said to be consistency-preserving iff C (cu) is a 
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consistent set for any consistent formula LY. Thus a preferential inference relation C is 
consistency-preserving iff C(a) # C whenever Cn(cu) # C. 
2.2. Preferential models 
A preferential structure is a triple M = (S, <, I) where < is an irreflexive and 
transitive relation defined on a set S (the set of “states”), and I (the “label function”) 
is a mapping from S into the set of worlds W. For any state s, we say that s satisfies 
a formula a (written s k a) iff I(s) does, and we denote by cr* the set of all states s 
satisfying the formula LY. 
A preferential model, as defined in [ 81, is a preferential structure (S, <, I) that 
satisfies the following condition of smoothness: given any formula (Y of C and any state 
s of LY* that is not minimal in LY*, there exists a state t minimal in a* such that t < s. 
This condition is always satisfied when the preferential structure is finite (i.e. when its 
set of states is finite), and in particular when the underlying language is supposed to be 
logically finite. 
A preferential model determines a preferential relation b,,, by: 
( def) it FM /? iff all minimal elements of CY* satisfy p. 
Conversely, it was shown in [ 81 that, for any preferential relation k defined on a 
language L (respectively a logically finite language L) , there exists a preferential model 
(respectively a finite preferential model) M that represents i_, i.e. is such that k=kM. 
The following simple result will be used in the next sections: 
Lemma 1. Let t- be a preferential inference relation represented by a preferential 
model M = (S, <, 1). Then one has a b p ifffor any state t that satisfies a A -p, there 
exists a state s < t that satisfies a. 
Proof. If LY k /3 and t satisfies (Y A l/3, t is not minimal in (Y*, hence there exists a 
state s E a* such that s < t. Conversely, if it is not the case that LY k p, there exists 
a state t minimal in cy* that satisfies +, and the inequality s < t cannot hold for an 
element s E cry*. 0 
2.3. injective models and faithfully representable preferential inference relations 
An injective preferential model is a model M = (S, <, I) where the label function E is 
injective [ 21. Injective models were initially proposed by Shoham [ 151 as a framework 
for preferential logic, but the wider notion of preferential model was adopted by the 
authors of [ 81, as they noticed the existence of inference relations that satisfy properties 
( l)-(6) without admitting a preferential injective model. We will mainly deal with the 
case where the map 1 is a bijection. Then, the set of states can be identified with the 
set W of all worlds, and the model M is of the form (K <) where < is a strict smooth 
partial order on W. Such a model will be called a faithful model. We shall say that 
a preferential relation is faithfully representable iff it can be represented by a faithful 
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model. Such a relation is clearly consistency-preserving. The following lemma shows 
that the converse holds in logically finite languages: 
Lemma 2:. In a logically finite language, a preferential inference relation is faithfully 
representable if and only if it admits an injective model and is consistency-preserving. 
Proof. The language being supposed to be finite, let b be a consistency-preserving 
preferential inference relation that admits an injective model (S, <) , where S is a subset 
of W. We claim that S = W. Indeed, let m be any element of M and x,,, the (finite) 
conjunction of all formulae satisfied by m. We have to prove that m E S. Since the 
relation by preserves consistency, we do not have x,,, b false, and there exists therefore 
an element s of S that satisfies ,ynt. By the choice of x,,,, we have s = m, and it follows 
that m E ,P as desired. •I 
In a finite language, the model ( W, <) that represents a faithfully representable infer- 
ence relation C is unique, and we will refer to it as the standard model of C. The order 
< on W may be then defined by: 
( def) m < n iff m k ~a for all formulae (Y such that n b C(a). 
(See the proof of Lemma 4.12 in [ 21 for details.) 
2.4. The basic set of defaults associated with a preferential model ( W <) 
Given a strict partial order < on the set W of worlds associated with an arbitrary 
propositia8nal language, there exists a set A< of formulae that play a prominent role in 
the study of faithfully representable inference relations. This set will be referred to as 
the basic set of defaults associated with the model ( W, <) ; it consists of all formulae a 
that satisfy the following condition: 
(*) If (Y is true at a world n, then LY is true at all worlds m such that m < n. 
It is not possible, in the general case, to define the basic set of defaults “associ- 
ated with a faithfully representable preferential inference relation k”, since such an 
inference relation may be defined by different faithful models. Nevertheless, when the 
language is logically finite, this set may be defined as the basic set of defaults as- 
sociated with the standard model of t_. In this particular case of a logically finite 
language, we will always suppose fixed a representative of each class under classical 
equivalence, and choose the elements (Y of the basic set of defaults among the repre- 
sentatives of these equivalence classes. Thus in a logically finite language, the basic set 
of defaults associated with a faithfully representable inference relation defined by the 
model (IA! <) is a finite set, that consists of all the representatives of the formulae LY 
satisfying (*) . 
Note that, in the general case, the basic set of default associated with a preferential 
model (UC <) is stable under conjunction and disjunction, and contains the tautologies 
as well as the contradictions of the language fZ. 
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3. Poole systems 
The definition and the principal properties of the inference relation associated with a 
Poole system can be found in [ 5,6,11]. We briefly recall some basic facts. 
Let D be any subset of f_Z We may identify D with a set of prerequisite-free normal 
Reiter-style defaults, every formula 6 of D corresponding then to the default f . Given 
a formula a of L, it therefore makes sense to build the intersection of all the Reiter 
extensions of (cy, D), as defined in [ 141. In this framework, a formula p will be con- 
sidered as a (nonmonotonic) consequence of (Y if and only if /3 lies in this intersection. 
This leads to the construction of the inference relation bD associated with the Poole 
system (D, 0), which is defined by 
(def) cy kD iff PE nCn(a,Dn), 
where the intersection is taken over all the subsets D, of D that are consistent with cy 
and maximal for that property. 
A simpler syntactic characterization will be given in Corollary 4. To take a simple 
example, in the particular case where D = (6) is a singleton, one sees that the relation 
ks boils down to: 
l LY b-s p iff p E Cn(a A 8) in the case where a is consistent with S, and 
l (Y bs p iff p E Cn(cu) when cy is inconsistent with 6. 
Thus, given the premiss a, the conclusion p is believed iff /3 classically follows from 
LY together with 6 in the case where LY A S is not a contradiction, and p classically 
follows from (Y when LY is inconsistent with 6. We emphasize that in the formal theory 
T obtained by taking 6 as an axiom, f3 is T-implied by LY iff p is classically implied by 
a A 6. It follows that a consistent formula LY may T-imply a contradiction, whilst this is 
not possible in the example of bs, which is clearly consistency-preserving. 
3.1. The semantics of Poole systems 
It is known that the inference relation kD associated with a Poole system (D,8) 
without constraints is a preferential inference relation (see for instance [ 111)) and it is 
immediate from its definition that this inference relation preserves consistency. We will 
refer to it as the inference relation induced by the set D. Note that if a set D induces the 
inference relation b, the sets D’ = D U &z&e} and D” = D U (true} induce the same 
inference relation. The semantics of such a relation turns out to be particularly simple to 
describe. Indeed, recalling that for any world Ipj denotes the set of all formulae satisfied 
by a world p, one has the following result, observed independently by Makinson [ 111 
and Poole [ 131: 
Observation 3 (Makinson and Poole). Zf kD is the preferential inference relation in- 
duced by a set D, and <p the relation defined on the set of worlds W by 
(def) m <o n ifs InI n D 5 [ml n D, 
the structure ( W <p) is a preferential model that represents bD. 
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Proof. The relation <o is clearly a strict partial order on W and the condition of smooth- 
ness readily follows from Zorn’s lemma. We have to prove that ( W, <n) represents kD, 
that is that (Y kD p iff all minimal elements of CY* satisfy @ 
Suppose first that we have (Y kD j3, and let m be a minimal element in LY*. We want 
to show that m + /3. Note that, since m k a, the set lrn( rl D is a subset of D that is 
consistent with (Y. We claim that it is maximal for that property: indeed, suppose that 
there exists a subset D’ of D consistent with a such that [ml n D 2 D’. Let n be a 
world that satisfies D’ and cx We have then D’ C InI n D, so IrnJ fl D 2 InI n D, and 
therefore n <D m, contradicting the choice of m. This shows that /m/ n D is maximal 
among the subsets of D that are consistent with CY. It follows from the definition of bD 
that -(Y V p E Cn( (ml n D), so m b T-X V /I. But m satisfies (Y, and therefore m must 
satisfy p. 
Suppose, now that we do not have (Y kD j3. Then there exists a subset D’ of D, 
maximal consistent with a, such that icy V p $ Cn( D’). Let m be a world that satisfies 
D’ and does not satisfy Y(Y V p. We see that m k (Y A --#?. Furthermore, m is minimal 
among the worlds that satisfy LY, otherwise there would exist a world n such that n b cy 
and we would have D’ C Jm( n D s InI n D, contradicting the maximality of D’. 
We have therefore proven that, if one does not have (Y kd p, there exists a world 
m that is minimal in cy* and that does not satisfy p. This completes the proof of 
Observation 3. IJ 
Note thatfor any set D, one has D c A where A is the basic set of defaults associated 
with the model (W, <n). Indeed, let a be any element of D, n a world that satisfies a 
and m a world such that m <o n. By definition of <o, InI fl D is a (strict) subset of 
/ml fl D, so that m must satisfy cy. Condition (*) in Section 2 is therefore satisfied and 
(Y E A. 
Observation 3 together with Lemma 1 provides a rather simple definition of the 
preferential inference relation associated with a set of defaults D: 
Corollary 4. For any preferential inference relation bD induced by a set D of defaults, 
one has LY /-_I, j3 if, for every world n that satisfies CY A-p, there exists a world m that 
satisfies LY with In( n D g (ml rl D. 
Proof. Clear. c3 
The order <D will be referred to as the order induced by D. Note that it follows from 
the above observation that the inference relation associated with any Poole system (D, 0) 
is faithfully representable. Evenmore, it is worth pointing out that the model described 
in the proposition above is particularly interesting because it is simple to build, and 
correspond:s to the intuitive idea that a world m is less exceptional, or more normal, 
than a world n iff it satis$es a greater subset of D than n does. If D is considered 
as a knowledge base or as a set of expectations, it is only natural that we consider as 
most normal the worlds that confirm as much as possible of the information provided 
by D. 
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Example 5 (The Alchourron44akinson theorem of triviality). Suppose that D is a 
closed consistent subset of L, that is D = Cn( D), D + L and let us determine 
the order < induced by D. Clearly, if a world m satisfies D and a world n does not, one 
has m < n. Conversely, suppose that m and n are two worlds such that m < n, and let 
us show that m satisfies D, while n does not: by definition of the order <, there exists 
a formula S E D such that m k 6 and n b 4. The world n therefore does not satisfy 
D. Let LY be any element of D. To prove that m b a, note that LY V -4 E Cn( D) = D, 
and that n + a V 4. It follows that m b a V 4, hence that m satisfies LY. This shows 
that m k D, and we have proven that, when D is a consistent closed subset of C, 
one has m < n i. m satisfies D and m does not. It follows that the model (W, <) is 
a ranked model with two ranks: at rank 0 we find all the worlds that satisfy D, and 
at rank 1 all the other ones. One shows then easily that the induced reIation CD is 
given by: 
Cn(a, D) when cy is consistent with D, 
C,(a) = 
Cn(ff) otherwise. 
When the language is logically finite, the standard model (W, <) of the preferential 
inference relation induced by a set of defaults D (cf. Section 2) coincides with the 
model (K <D) and is therefore quite easy to write down: 
Example 6 (Penguins). We consider the information provided by the well-known tri- 
angle “penguins are birds, birds fly, penguins don’t fly”, which can be represented by 
the set of defaults 
Let us denote the worlds associated with the language C on p, b and f by the 
sequence of elementary propositions that they satisfy. Thus, the world p is the world 
that satisfies p A Tb A 1 f, the world * is the world that satisfies lp A lb A 1 f, etc. To 
determine the preferential model associated with the inference relation induced by D, 
we first write down the eight worlds attached with L: together with the formulae in D 
that they satisfy: 
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The inference relation t-~ induced by D is thus given by the preferential model 
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A 
pbf b pb P 
* f bf 
where the lines represent connection between worlds through the order <o. 
Note that the default b -+ f is the only element of D that is preserved in the 
resulting inference relation: one has indeed b t- f, but neither p b -f, nor p /- b. 
In this sce:ptical approach of default reasoning, rather than choosing a particular Reiter 
extension in which two of the three initial defaults would be preserved, the defaults 
p -+ b and p -+ -f are simply replaced by the weaker conditionals p A f k b and 
pA-bblf. 
Example 7. Let C be the language built on three propositional variables p, q and r, 
andDthesetD={cu,p,r,S},wherea=(pVq)Ar,p=~pAr,y=(IpVq)Alr, 
8=pAv. 
We leave it as an exercise for the reader to check that the preferential model 
P * 4 r pr pqr 
is the standard model associated with the induced relation bD. 
3.2. Faithfully representable inference relations and Poole systems 
As results from Observation 3, the preferential inference relation induced by a set of 
defaults is faithfully representable. The question naturally arises whether the converse 
is true, that is whether any faithfully representable inference relation might be induced 
by some set of defaults. The following example shows that this is not in general the 
case: 
Example II. Let pI ,pz, . . . , p,,, . . . be a countable set of propositional variables and L 
the propositional language of the pi’s. For each index i, denote by mi the world that 
takes value 1 on pi and 0 on the pi’s, j # i. Observe that any element of the intersection 
fii lmil can be written as a conjunction of formulae si A s:! A . . e A s,. where each si is 
a disjunction of literals that cannot be all positive. It follows that this set is satisfied by 
the world m* that takes value 0 on all the pi’s_ Let < be the ranked order on W with 
the following two ranks: at rank 0, put all the worlds rni, and at rank 1 all the other 
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worlds. The minimal worlds are therefore all the m;‘s. We claim that < thus defjned 
cannot be induced by a set D. Suppose indeed that one has -C = <D for some set D. 
We can suppose that D contains no contradiction. Let us denote by Dk the maximal 
consistent subsets of D. Clearly, a world is minimal iff it satisfies one of the Dk’s. Note 
that D cannot be a consistent set: otherwise, D would be a subset of ni lrntl and would 
therefore be satisfied by m*, contradicting the fact that m* is not minimal. Since D is 
not consistent, there exists in D at least two different maximal consistent subsets Dk 
and Dt, and it follows readily that there exists a formula LY that lies in Dk and not in 
Dt. Denote by q any world that satisfies Dt. Such a world is minimal. Observe that any 
world n that satisfies LY must also be minimal, since otherwise, by the choice of the 
order relation <, one would have q <b n and q would satisfy Dt U {a}. Therefore, if a 
world n satisfies IX, n must be one of the m;‘s. But if h and j are two index such that 
pl, and pj are not elements of Var(cu), one readily sees that there exists a world that 
satisfies a A pa A pj and that this world cannot be any of the mi’s. 
We do not know of any necessary and sufficient condition that should satisfy a 
faithfully representable inference relation in order to be induced by a set of defaults. 
Nevertheless, as will be shown in Theorem 13, the following sufficient condition turns 
out to provide such a characterization in the case where the underlying language is 
logically finite: 
Observation 9. Let k be a preferential inference relation defined by a faithful model 
( W <) and A its associated basic set of defaults. Suppose that the following condition 
(**) holds: 
(**) For any world p, there exists a non-empty subset A, of A 
suchthatm~A,iffm=porm<p. 
Then b is induced by its basic set of defaults. 
Proof. Observe first that it follows readily from the definition of A that the sets A, are 
subsets of A. We have to show that < = <A. Suppose first that one has m < n. If cy is 
a formula of A that is satisfied by It, one has m k (Y by definition of A, and InI n A is 
therefore a subset of Irnl fl A. Moreover, the existence of the set A,,,, a subset of A that 
is readily satisfied by m and not by n, implies that the above inclusion is strict, and we 
have shown that m <A n. Conversely, suppose that we have m <A n. Note that m # n. 
Since n satisfies A,, the definition of <A shows that the same is true for m. It follows 
then from the definition of A, that one has m < n. q 
We noticed that when a preferential inference relation /-- is induced by a set of 
defaults D, this set must be embedded in the basic set of defaults A associated with the 
model (K <D) of b. When condition (**) of Observation 9 holds, it is possible to 
determine a strict subset of A that induces the same relation: 
Observation 10. Suppose that the condition (**) of Observation 9 is satisfied, and 
denote by A* the union of all the subsets A,. Then the relation b is induced by A*. 
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Proof. Suppose first that we have m < n. If (Y is a formula of A*, we have (Y E A. 
Hence, if II satisfies (Y, the same is true for m. Moreover, m k A,,,, and n does not 
satisfy this set. There exists therefore an element S E A, C A* that is satisfied by m 
and not by n. It follows that InI f’ A* is a strict subset of [ml n A*, and we have shown 
that m <A* n. Conversely, suppose that m <A* n. As n satisfies the set A,,, which is 
a subset of A*, we have also m /= A,. Therefore, we have m = n or m < n. But the 
equality is impossible since we supposed that m <A* n, and the proof of the observation 
is complete. 0 
We are now able to prove the main result of this section: when the underlying language 
is$nite, any consistency-preserving preferential inference relation defined by an injective 
model is induced by its associated basic set of defaults. In view of Observation 9, it is 
enough to prove the following. 
Observatilon 11. Condition (**) holds for any faithfully representable preferential 
inference relation + defined on a logically finite language. Such a relation is therefore 
induced by its basic set of defaults. 
Proof. For any world q, denote by xq the complete formula associated with q, that is 
the conjunction of all literals that are true in q, Let (u! <) be the standard model of l- 
and A its associated basic set of defaults. For any world p, let 6, be the formula equal 
to x1, if p is minimal and to ,yP V ( vnlcp ,ym ) otherwise. Note that a world m satisfies 
IS, iff m = p or m < p, so that condition (**) of Observation 9 is readily satisfied for 
the set At, = {a,}. 0 
As observed in Section 2, the faithful model of a faithfully representable preferential 
inference relation is unique when the underlying language in finite. Therefore, the set 
A* = {S, 1 p E W} only depends on the given inference relation b. We will refer to 
this set as the determinant of the inference relation k. As an immediate consequence 
of Observations 10 and 11, we have the following corollary: 
Corollary 12. Any faithfully representable preferential inference relation defined on a 
logically finite language is induced by its determinant. 
Proof. Clear. 0 
We can now summarize our results: 
Theorem 13. Given any consistency-preserving preferential inference relation b de- 
fined on a logically jnite language L by an injective model, there exists a subset D of 
C such that k coincides with the inference relation TV associated with the Poole system 
(D, 0). 
Proof. Immediate by Lemma 2 and Observation 11. q 
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Theorem 13 may be equivalently restated as follows: 
Theorem 14. For any strict partial order < defined on the set W of worlds associated 
with a logically$nite language C, there exists a subset D of C such that < = <o. 
Proof. Since the language is finite, the structure (W, <) is smooth, and is therefore a 
faithful preferential model. One concludes, applying Theorem 13. q 
The meaning of the above theorems is that, under some mild conditions, preferential 
reasoning B la Shoham is the same as reasoning 5 la Poole. But its interest is also to 
point out the existence of a basic set of defaults that comes to conditionalize, implicitly 
or explicitly, any agent that uses a faithfully representable logic on a finite language. 
As will be seen in the next section, this applies in particular to any agent that uses 
consistency-preserving rational logic. This result is reminiscent of some well-known 
theories about human behaviour, in as much as they claim that human beings are 
determined in their judgements and actions, by a set of primary affects. In this sense, it 
is worth pointing out the formal analogy that exists between the result stated above and 
the most classical psychoanalytic theories. 
Applying Corollary 4, one sees that, in a finite language, given any consistency- 
preserving inference relation C defined by an injective model, there exists a set D such 
that p E C (cu) iff for any world n that satisjes a A -/3, there exists a world m that 
satisjies (Y with In/ n D 2 [ml n D. If the given inference relation is not supposed to 
be consistency-preserving, this result is no longer true, but it may be applied to the 
consistency-preserving component C, of C, defined by 
C,(ff) = 
C(ff> if C(a) is consistent, 
Cn( a) otherwise. 
One easily checks indeed that C, is a faithfully representable preferential inference 
relation, and it follows that there exists a set D such that for all formulae (Y, either 
C(a) is an inconsistent set, or C(a) is given by a condition identical to the one above. 
The proofs are straightforward and we leave them to the reader. 
Although both the basic set of defaults A and the determinant A* induce, in a finite 
language, the same given faithfully representable inference relation, the set A* often 
turns out to be easier to write down than the set A. Note that the cardinality of A* is 
equal to 2”, where IZ is the number of atomic propositions of the language. The link 
between A and A* is fully described by the following: 
Observation 15. Let < be a strict partial order on the set W of worlds associated with 
a logically $nite language, A its associated basic set of defaults and A* its determinant. 
Then, modulo classical equivalence, a formula CI is an element of A iff it is a disjunction 
of formulae of A*. 
Proof. We noticed (at the end of Section 2) that A is stable by disjunction. Since A* 
is a subset of A, any disjunction of formulae of A* is an element of A. To show that 
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the converse is true, let cy be any element of A. If a is inconsistent, a is a disjunction 
over an empty set. Suppose that (Y is consistent, and denote by S(a) the disjunction of 
all the elements S, for m maximal among the worlds that satisfy LY. We claim that LY is 
classically equivalent to S(a). Suppose first that a world (I satisfies a. If q is maximal 
among the formulae that satisfy cy, we have q b S,, and therefore q b S(u). If q is not 
maximal among these formulae, there exists a world m such that q < m, m maximal 
among the worlds that satisfy (Y. We have then q b S,,,, hence q b 6(a). This shows 
that LY + S(Q). Let us check conversely that S(a) b cy: take a world p that satisfies 
S(a). There exists a world m, maximal among the worlds that satisfy LY, such that 
P t= 4n. We have then p = m, in which case p b a, or p < m. But (Y is an element 
of A, and therefore, since m k u, condition (*) implies that p b a. This shows that 
a((~) k a, and the proof of the observation is complete. 0 
We now compute the set A* in two examples: 
Example 5 (continued). Let S be any formula of a logically finite language, and 
D = Cn( 13;). We saw that the order < of the standard model (w <) of the inference 
relation induced by D is defined by: m < n iff m k 6 and n k 4. We have 
It can be shown that the basic set of defaults A associated with the model (U: <) 
consists OS all the formulae q5 that either classically imply S, or are classically implied 
by 6. Cl 
Example ti (continued). The preferential model associated with 
D={p+b, b+fp+lf} 
was shown to be 
pbf b pb P 
* f bf 
Let us list the elements of A*: 
6, = -‘p A Tb A -f, 
Sf = -7p A Tb A f, 
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& = ‘p A b A f, 
&bf=XpbfVX*VXfVXbf=(7Pf’(b+f))V(fA(p+b)), 
ab = lp, 
~~b=(pAbA7f)V(lpA(b--tf)), 
s,=lbr\(p~lf)V(lpA(b-,f)), 
Spf = b -+ f. 
One sees from this simple example that the determinant is generally not the simplest 
of the subsets that induce a given inference relation. 
Example 7 (continued). The faithful model ( W, <) of the inference relation defined in 
Example 6 was shown to be 
* P 4 r pr p9r 
The set A* then consists of the eight formulae 8, where m E W, namely 
A*={pAqAlr, TpAqAr, ?A(lpAlq)V(pAq), PAT?-, qAv; 
TpAr, rA(pATq)A(qA-p), qAr}. 
NotethatqEA-A*. 
Remark 16. It is worth noticing that the set A* separate the worlds: if two worlds m 
and n agree on A*, they must be equal. Indeed, since m k S,,, E A*, we have n k &, 
so n = m or n < m. Similarly, one sees that m = n or m < n, hence the equality. 
3.3. Comparison with Giirdenfors-Makinson’s work 
It is interesting to compare the result stated in Theorem 13 with those proven by 
Gardernfors and Makinson in [ 57. There, the authors introduced the notion of a selection 
function in the following way: given a set D of defaults, a selection function So 
associates with any formula cx a set of subsets of D that are maximal consistent with 
LY. The interest of these functions, as follows from [5, Theorem 2.41, is that for any 
preferential inference relation C defined on an arbitrary propositional language C, there 
exists a subset D of L and a selection function So such that, for all formula LY, one has 
C(a) = n Cn( LY, D,), where the intersection is taken over all the elements of So ( LX). 
Theorem 13 shows that, in the particular case where C is a faithfully representable 
preferential relation defined on a logically jnite language, the selection function can be 
chosen to be the trivial one, that is the one where, for each formula a, SD ((u) is the set 
of all the subsets of D that are maximal consistent with cr. Note, nevertheless, that the 
set D whose existence is proven in Theorem 13 is not in general closed under logical 
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consequence, whilst in [ 51 this set is always taken to be C(true), and is therefore 
closed und(er logical consequence. 
3.4. The d:vnamics of Poole systems 
Since, in finite languages, the preferential logic of an agent is always conditionalized 
by a set of defaults, it is natural to study the effect, on such a logic, of a perturbation 
of this set. This perturbation may or may not be analyzed as a revision of the set of 
defaults, considered as a belief base, but it seems clear that the “classical” postulates 
for revision are inadequate in this framework: indeed, the gestalt that is at the origin 
of these postulates considers the knowledge base of an agent as a whole, independently 
of the resulting behaviour that is going to be adopted by this agent after her beliefs 
have been revised. Thus, revision theory is only concerned with some principles that 
regulate thfe evolution of a knowledge base in the presence of new information, and 
does not take into account the influence of this evolution on the induced logic. In the 
perspective of Gtidenfors-Makinson, for instance, the process of revision is completely 
described by means of an inference relation, which will eventually determine the way 
a belief should change when new information is provided (see [ 51 and [ 61) ; but this 
formal link with nonmonotonic logic is of little use in the framework of Poole systems: 
G&rdenfors and Makinson [6] proposed to analyze the revision of K by a formula (Y 
as an inference operation from the proposition LY, so that the resulting theory K * cy 
is interpretj:d as the set of consequences of LY module K. In this proposal, the theory 
K is considered as a static one, and not as a medium which only device is to induce 
an inference relation. Quite different is the framework of Poole systems, where default 
sets of formulae are considered as equivalent when they induce the same inference 
relation. Thus, the dynamics of Poole systems may be indifferently studied through a 
revision of either of these sets. Furthermore, in this perspective, the admissible changes 
of a set of defaults should obey rules that fundamentally differ from those applicable 
to classical revision theory. One may require for instance that the consistency of the 
basic set of defaults is preserved, that the new order <D, differs from the old one 
only for a minimal number of couples of worlds, and that the property of rationality 
is preserveId: the admissible changes of a set D of defaults that induces a rational 
inference relation would have thus to be chosen among those that will still induce a 
relation of this type. These questions can be only evoked here and will be more deeply 
studied in a forthcoming paper. Some examples will be nevertheless discussed in the 
next section. 
4. The rational case 
In this section, we consider the particular case of rational inference relations and 
we shall show that these relations may be advantageously studied through a set that is 
more tractable than the associated determinant. We first recall some basic definitions 
and facts. 
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A rational inference relation is a preferential inference relation that satisfies the 
condition of rational monotony: 
UW If LY b p, and not (Y b 77, then a A y k p. 
The semantics of rational inference relations is particularly simple to describe: a pref- 
erential inference relation is rational iff it can be represented by an injective preferential 
model (S, <), where < is a smooth modular order defined on a subset S of W. We recall 
that a order on S is modular iff there exists a totally ordered set (T, <‘) and a ranking 
function K from (S, <) into (T <‘) such that m < n iff n(m) <’ u(n). Equivalently, 
an order < on S is modular iff, for all elements m, n, p of S such that m < n, either 
m<p,orp<n. 
In a logically finite language, a rational relation is faithfully representable if and 
only if it is consistency-preserving. When this is the case, one can always suppose that 
the ranking function K is defined on the whole set W, and takes value in a finite set 
of integers. The height h of such a rational relation or, equivalently, of its standard 
model, is defined by h = I[K( W)I). W e will always suppose that the ranking function is 
normalized, i.e. that K(W) is the set [0, h - l] = {0,1,2,. . . , h - 1). 
Example 8 shows that, in the general case of arbitrary languages, there exists rational 
inference relations that are not induced by any set of defaults. No characterization of 
the rational relations that can be determined by such a set is known in the general case. 
Nevertheless, the following analogue of Observation 9 provides an interesting result: 
Observation 17. Let b be a faithfully representable rational relation de$ned by the 
ranked model ( W <). Suppose that the associated ranking function K takes its value in 
the set of integers, and that its satisjies the following condition (w*): 
(***) For any non-zero integer i, there exists a formula 6i 
such that m k a; iff K(m) < i. 
Then exists a set D, totally ordered through classical implication, that induces the 
relation k. 
Conversely, any family D offormulae D = (61,&, , . . , Sk, . . .) with Si k 6i+l induces 
a rational inference relation, the ranking of which satisfies condition (***). 
Proof. We suppose first that (***) holds and show that < = co, where D is the family 
of all the formulae &. Clearly, one has Si b Si+r , so that D is totally ordered through 
classical implication. If m < n, and S; is an element of D satisfied by II, we have 
K(n) < i, hence K(m) < i , and m /= 8;. Moreover, if j = K(m), we see that the 
formula Sj+l is satisfied by m but not by n, and it follows that InI fl D is a strict subset 
of /ml n D, that is m <n n. Conversely, suppose that m <n n. If i is the rank of n, one 
sees that n satisfies 6i+t, and the same is therefore true for m, whence j = K(m) < i. 
As there exists an index k such that m k & and n /= 7&, we do not have n < m, and 
therefore we have j < i, that is m < n, which completes the proof of the first part of 
the observation. 
Suppose now that D = (61, 62, . . . , S,, . . .} c C is such that, for all i’s, 6t k ai+,, and 
let bD be the preferential inference relation induced by D. This relation is represented 
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by the faithful model (W, <D). We claim that for any worlds m and n, we have m <D n 
ifs there exists an element 6 E D that is satisfied by m and not by n: indeed, if m <D n, 
such an element exists by the definition of <D. Conversely, if such an element S exists, 
observe that Irnl fl D # InI fl D. Furthermore, for any element 8 E D satisfied by n, 
the hypothesis made on D together with the fact that n does not satisfy 6 implies that 
6 k 8, so that m satisfies 6’. It follows that InI fI D C_ [ml rl D, and we have shown that 
m <D n. 
It is now easy to prove that <D is a modular order: if m, n and p are three worlds 
such that m <D n but not m <o p, there exists an element 6 of D that is satisfied by m 
and not by n, and this element must be satisfied by p. It follows that p <D n, and the 
modularity is proven. To prove Observation 17, it remains only to show that condition 
(***) holds when D is of the form D = {&,&, . . . , &, . . .} with Sj b Sj+l. Clearly, 
the set D’ = D U {True} is totally ordered through classical implication and induces the 
same rational inference relation as D. Let K be the ranking function associated with the 
modular order <D = <Dl, i any element of K(W) and n a world of rank i. If ]nlnD # 8, 
let k(i) be the first index such that n k 8&i); set &k(i) = True otherwise. We have then 
for any world m, m k Sk(i) iff K(m) < K(n), that is iff K(m) < i + 1, which shows 
that condition (***) is satisfied. 0 
It is worth noticing that condition (***) is not in general satisfied by an arbitrary 
faithfully riepresentable rational inference relation, even though this latter may be induced 
by a set of defaults: for instance, in Example 5 with D a closed subset of L: such that 
D # Cn( 8) for any formula 8, there exists no formula 6 such that m b 6 iff K(m) < 1, 
since this latter inequality is equivalent to m k D. We shall nevertheless show that 
condition (***) always holds in logically finite languages. 
4.1. The characteristic set of a rational relation defined on a finite language 
Supposing we work in a finite language, our first result is that condition (***> of 
Observation 17 holds. 
Observation 18. Condition (***) holds in finite languages. 
Proof. Let b be a rational inference relation defined on a logically finite language and 
(W; <) its associated standard model. Denote by h the height of the associated ranking 
function K. For any integer i, 0 < i < h - 1, let @; be a representative of the disjunction 
over all worlds n of rank less than i of the complete formulae associated with n, that is 
*i = Vfr(n) :i ,y,,. Set I,+, = True. One has then clearly m + fii iff K(m) < i. 0 
The set P = {t/3i} will be referred to as the characteristic set of the relation (or, 
equivalently, as the characteristic set of the model (K <). Note that it has cardinality 
equal to h, and that its satisfies the property of separating the ranks: two worlds agree 
on P iff they have same rank. Its main feature is that, given two worlds m and n, one 
has m < n. iff there exists an index i such that ljli is satisfied by m and not by n, or, 
equivalently, iff m satisfies strictly more elements in P than n. The elements of the 
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characteristic set ly form a chain with last term equal to true, in the sense that they 
are totally ordered through classical implication. We will call such an h-tuple a logical 
chain. 
A notion similar to that of a characteristic set could have been defined in an analogous 
way in the case where the preferential model (K <) is not supposed to be ranked, 
defining, for any non-minimal world m, the formula +,,, as the disjunction over all 
worlds n < m of the complete formulae associated with n. Thus the “generalized 





could have been defined as the set 
<,J,. induced on W by the set 1v* 
the following diagram: 
/ 
* 
{x*, xp V x*, true}. But one notices that the order 




Therefore, one does not have < = <y*. For this reason, the interest of defining the 
set W in the general case of preferential relations is not obvious. Nevertheless, we shall 
see at the end of this section that this set may play an important role in the framework 
of the dynamics of a Poole system. For the moment we note that in the case where the 
order < defined on W is supposed to be modular, the equality < = <y does hold: 
Theorem 19. In a finite language, any rational inference relation is induced by its 
characteristic set. 
Proof. Immediate, using Observations 17 and 18. Cl 
Note that the above result leaves open the question of characterizing all the sets D 
such that i_D is rational. Theorem 19 only shows that, given such a set D, there exists 
a set !t’j totally ordered through classical implication such that bD = kyI. 
A consequence of Theorem 19 is the existence of a simple syntactic characterization 
of all rational relations defined in a finite language: 
Theorem 20. For any consistency-preserving rational inference relation C defined on 
a logically finite language, there exists a logical chain (#I, &, . . . , $~z) with I,&~ = true 
and cc/i k #i+l for all i < h, such that, for any consistent formula a, one has C(o) = 
Cn( a, J/i) where i is the first index such that cy is consistent with $i. 
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Proof. Let P be the characteristic set of b. By Corollary 4, one has p E C(a) iff for 
any world 12 that satisfies LY A +?, there exists a world m that satisfies (Y, with m -+ n. 
If i is the first index such that (Y is consistent with $i, the formula (Y A #; is satisfied 
by all worlds of rank strictly less than i, and only by these worlds. Therefore one has 
(Y k /3 iff the formula (Y A + is inconsistent with $;, whence the result. 0 
A consequence of Theorem 19 is that a rational inference relation is fully determined 
by its characteristic set. Conversely, one easily shows that there exists only one logical 
chain that induces a given rational inference relation. This remark is of interest in the 
framework of theory change: if the admissible perturbations of a given rational inference 
relation xe to be chosen among those that preserve rationality, it is natural to require 
that the revision of a logical chain yields again a logical chain. This implies that there 
is no stability under revision, as the initial chain and the revised chain, if different, will 
necessarily give rise to different inference relations. 
Before looking at some examples, we note that the set P is of minimal cardinality 
among the subsets of fZ that induce a rational inference relation: 
Observation 21. Let ( W <) be a ranked model de$ned on a logically finite language, 
P its characteristic set and D a subset of L such that < = <o. Then the number of 
elements of P is at most equal to the number of elements of D. 
Proof. Let h be the number of elements of P. Then h is the height of the model (K <). 
Note that if the order <A induced on W by a subset A of ,C is modular, the height of this 
order is the length of a strictly decreasing sequence of subsets of A, so that this length 
is at most equal to the number of elements of A. Since we supposed that < = <D, it 
follows that h is at most equal to the number of elements of D. 0 
Example 8 (continued). Consider a consistent formula (Y, and set D = Cn( (u) . Recall 
that the order < = <D on W is a ranked order, defined by m < n iff LY is satisfied by m 
and not by n. The height of this model is thus equal to 2, and its characteristic set is 
Iv = {a, tiwe}. 
Example 22. One checks easily that the characteristic set of a consistency-preserving 
rational inference relation is the singleton true iff this relation is equal to the classical 
consequence operation Cn. 
4.2. Comparison with Grove’s work 
In [7] ,, Grove proposed a model for belief revision in terms of a family Ki of 
“spheres” around an agent theory K. These spheres are subtheories of K, that are 
obtained by removing from K all sentences that are not “sufficiently entrenched” (see 
also [ lo] for a presentation of this work). More precisely, Grove showed that, given 
any revision * of K satisfying the extended set of ACM postulates, there exists a total 
ordered family of subtheories Ki such that, for any formula LY, the revision K * a of K 
by cy is equal to the expansion Cn( Ki, a) of one of the spheres by (Y. This sphere Ki 
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is the greatest one that is consistent with cy. Conversely, given a totally ordered family 
of subtheories Ki of K, the operation * on K that associates with any formula (Y the 
expansion by cy of the greatest Ki consistent with CY is a revision operation that satisfies 
the extended set of AGM postulates. 
In the finite case, this result may be seen as a direct consequence of Theorem 20: 
indeed, any revision * of K that satisfies the extended set of AGM postulates yields a 
consistency-preserving rational inference relation b, defined by: (Y k, p iff /3 E K * a. 
If (+1,@2,...,W is th e associated characteristic set and if, for all i, Ki is the set 
Ki = Cn( $i), one has a b, /3 iff TLY V p E Kt where i is the first index such that cy 
is consistent with Ki. If follows that K * a = Cn( Ki, (Y) is equal to the expansion of Ki 
by (Y. 
4.3. Rationalizing an irrational behaviour 
Suppose that the behaviour of an agent is conditionalized by a preferential logic, and 
that it appears desirable or necessary that this agent acts rationally. The initial behaviour, 
represented by a preferential inference relation bP is therefore to be changed into a 
rational inference relation, IR. One way to proceed is to take for bR the rational closure 
of /or (see [9] for a discussion of the existence of the rational closure). The main 
feature of this “closure” is that it is an extension of the given relation kP, so that the 
conditional a bR /? holds whenever (Y bP holds. Rationalizing an agent’s behaviour 
through rational closure will therefore consist in adding some missing connections, 
without suppressing any of the existing ones. The procedure of taking the rational 
closure of a preferential relation is nevertheless far from being simple. Another way, 
that seems much simpler, is to first “revise” the determinant A* or the “generalized 
characteristic set” P* of kP so as to get a logical chain P, which will induce the 
desired rational relation. There exists of course several ways of transforming A* into a 
logical chain (fii, &, . . . , True), and we will only mention two of them. 
Concatenation of chains 
Let P* be the generalized characteristic set of bP, that is the set of all formulae 
cc, “9 where +,, is the disjunction over all worlds m < n of the complete formulae 
associated with m, for n non-minimal, and (jl,, = true for n minimal. The set P* may 
then be seen as an union of logical chains. Observe that if (~0 t_ CYI t_ +. . k a, and 
PO j- pt j-- ..+ k & are two chains with, say, k < n, then 
is again a chain. Taking for (ai) a chain of maximal length in P, one can therefore 
proceed by concatenation to obtain a set P*, the elements of which form a logical chain, 
that will induce the desired rutionalizution of b. 
Example 23. Let kP be induced by the set A* = {up V q, p, p A q, q} and represented 
by the preferential model (K <> 






with order < defined by pq < q, pq < p < *. To write down the elements of the 
generalize’d characteristic set, it is simpler to associate to any formula of P* the set of 
all worlds that satisfy this formula, remembering that, for n non-minimal, a world m 
satisfies I@” iff m < n. We have thus +* = {p,pq) = p, eP = t,bq = {pq} = p A q. The 
set 1y* is therefore qual to {p A q, p, he}, and consists on a single logical chain. The 




Note that the order <R is an extension of <, so that, by Lemma 1, the rationalized 
relation kR extends the relation k,,. Cl 
Example 6 (continued). We take for kP the inference relation induced by the set 
D = {p -+ b, b --+ f, p + -f}. As noticed above, the associated standard model (I%! <> 
is given by 
pbf b pb P 
* f bf 
The elements of the associated generalized characteristic set P* are 
~~bf’=~b=~lpb=~I,=~pA\b~f), 
~p~=(pAbAf)V(pA~bAlf)V~~~f=(bAf)V(~bA(p--’~f). 
We have P* = (7p A (b -+ f). (b A f) V Tb A (p + Tf),true}, and the resulting 
rationalized relation is determined by the ranked model 
b pf pb 2 
pbf P 1 
*fbf 0 
Note that tvR is again an extension of kP. 
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The characteristic ranking 
The process of concatenation described above is not standard, in the sense that it 
depends of the chain of maximal length that is chosen. It is possible to rationalize 
the preferential inference relation induced by its determinant A* by ordering the set W 
through the number of elements of the generalized characteristic set !P* that a world 
may satisfy. The characteristic rank of a world is then simply defined as the number of 
elements of P* that are not satisfied by this world. Recalling that a world m satisfies 
the element @,, of P* iff m < n, we see that the characteristic rank of a world m can 
be directly computed through the number of worlds n such that m < n. To compute this 
rank, it is therefore not necessary to display the generalized characteristic set. In the 
penguin example, for instance, the number of nontrivial elements of P* satisfied by a 
world are given by: 
m Number of elements of P satisfied by 








We see that the resulting rationalized inference relation bR is again determined by 
the model 
b pb pf 2 
pbf P 1 
*fbf 0 
The process of rationalization via the characteristic ranking is clearly much simpler 
than that of chains concatenation. Its properties will be studied in detail in a forthcoming 
paper, but it is worth noticing for the present that the resulting relation bR always extends 
the original one kp, and agrees with it iff bp is already rational. The proof of this 
observation is straightforward, noticing that if D is a logical chain, then the order <o 
induced by D satisfies m <o n iff m satisfies more elements in D than n. 
4.4. Revising a rational behaviour 
Even when an agent’s behaviour is rational, it may be desirable to revise it in order 
to take into account some new information. The problem of revising a rational inference 
relation amounts then to revise the (unique) logical chain p = {@I, 1,b2,. . . , @h-l, true} 
that induces a given rational inference relation, in such a way that the resulting set is 
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again a logical chain. If, moreover, one requires that the revision of P by true should 
yield again the set P, one sees that the simplest admissible revision is the one defined, 
for any formula (Y, by ??’ 0 a = {t,hk A a, @&+I A a,. . . , &_I A a, a, true}, where k is the 
first index such that +& is consistent with a. Thus, in the above example, revising the 
characteristic set P = {yp A (b -+ f), (b A f) V lb A (p + -f), true} by the formula 
p yields the logical chain 
sOP={PA((bAf)V(lbAlf)),p,true}, 
with associated ranked model 
*bbff 2 
pb of 1 
pbf P 0 
5. Defadt extensions 
We shall now apply to some specific rational inference relations the results proven 
in the preceding section. From now on, we suppose that we work on a logically finite 
propositional language. 
5.1. Defa,ult ranking through rational closure 
We suppose given a conditional knowledge base K, that consists of a finite number 
of conditional assertions ai =+ pi, where ai and pi are elements of a logically finite 
language .A conditional LY + /3 represents a piece of information that can be interpreted 
as “if a, then normally P,‘. Note that such a conditional is not an element of the 
language, so that the set K is not to be taken as a subset of L. The material counterpart 
of the conditional LY + /3 is the formula LY + /I, equivalent to SLY V /3. The material 
counterpart K* of a knowledge base K is the conjunction of the material counterparts 
of its conditionals. 
We wish to build from K a rational inference relation bK (or simply b when there 
is no ambiguity) that will extend K, in the sense that (Y b p should hold for all 
conditionals (Y + p that are in K. A first solution to this extension problem was given 
by Lehmann and Magidor [9] and consists of the so-called rational closure of K, which 
we briefly describe. 
Following [ 9 1, we say that a formula cy is exceptional for a set A of conditional asser- 
tions if and only if LY is inconsistent with the material counterpart A* of A. This means 
that any world that satisfies LY must falsify at least one assertion of A. A conditional 
assertion u + /3 is said to be exceptional for a set A iff its antecedent (Y is. 
Given the conditional base K, one defines inductively the subsets Ki (1 < i < h) 
in the following way: K1 is taken to be equal to K and, for each index i such that Ki 
is not empty, Ki+l is the set of all conditionals cy + p of Ki whose antecedent cy is 
exceptional for Ki. The conditional base K is assumed to be consistent: This implies that 
we will always suppose that the subsets Ki deBned as above form a strictly decreasing 
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sequence, with last term equal to the empty set. We will refer to this sequence as the 
LM-sequence. 
The set W of worlds is ranked through the LM-ranking function KLM that assigns to 
every world m the value i - 1 where i is the least integer such that m satisfies Ki. The 
corresponding rational relation kLMcKj, called the rational closure of K, satisfies then 
the desired property of extending K. Note that the height of this relation is equal to the 
integer h such that Kt, is empty. 
Consider the conditional base K = {b + f, p + b, p + 1 f}. Its rational closure is 
represented by the model 
P pf pbf 2 
b bp 1 
*bff 0 
Let us determine its characteristic set: one has 
P={ypA(IbV f),(TpVb) A(lpVTf),true} 
={ypA(b+f),(p + b) A (P -, -f), true}, 
that is, recalling that the material counterpart of a set A is denoted by A*, W = 
{K;, Kg, true}. This result holds in the general case: 
Theorem 24. Let K be a conditional base and Ki, 1 < i < h its LM-sequence with 
Kt, = 0. Then the characteristic set of its rational closure is the set of all KT, 1 < i < h. 
Proof. From the definition of the rank of a world, we see that a world m satisfies KT iff 
uLM(m) < i. By Observation 17, it follows that KIT E P for all i < h. One concludes, 
since 9 has exactly h elements. Cl 
The above result has interesting theoretical and practical consequences. It shows that 
the rational closure of a conditional knowledge base K is induced by a set of n elements, 
each of them equal to the material counterpart of a different term of the LM-sequence. 
Thus, it appears that the complexity of any procedure grounded on rational closure can 
be evaluated with respect o the height of this closure, independently of the size of the 
given knowledge base. 
In fact, Theorem 24 has an important consequence, concerning the representation of
rational inference relations by means of conditional knowledge bases. Let indeed 1_ be a 
consistency-preserving rational inference relation defined on a logically finite language. 
Clearly, such an inference relation may be analyzed as the rational closure of the set 
K of conditional assertions defined by K = { a + p 1 a t- /3}, This trivial observation 
leads nevertheless toan interesting problem, which is the problem of rational behaviour 
decoding: given such a rational inference relation k, is it possible to explicitly find 
a conditional knowledge base K of minimal order such that b = kLMcKj? In other 
words, is it possible to determine a set of basic rules that conditionalize the behaviour 
of a rational agent? The answer to this question is a surprisingly simple consequence of 
Theorem 24: 
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Theorem 25. Let b be a consistency-preserving rational inference relation defined on 
a logicall;v$nite language, P its characteristic set and h its height. Then there exists a 
conditional knowledge base containing exactly h elements, whose rational closure is the 
inference relation b. More precisely, if the elements of Cy are denoted by 1~51, t & . , . , t+?h, 
with $i b $i+t for all i < h and et, = true, the conditional base may be taken equal to 
the set 
Proof. Let us denote bLMcKj the rational closure of the conditional base K = {True + 
$1, Th =s ff2,7*2 =+ *3,. . .1+,-l * $4,). 
To show that k = kLMcKj, we only have to check that the characteristic sets of 
these relations are equal. Computing the LM-sequence of K, we find, using the fact that 
l)i t_ #i+t for all i < 72, 
We conclude by Theorem 24. 0 
K;-, = {+h--l~}, 
When a conditional knowledge base K of cardinality n extends, through rational 
closure, into a rational inference relation of height h, one has clearly h < n, and the 
above theorem shows that the base K may be replaced by a base K’ whose cardinality 
is h. Therefore it is in general possible to replace a base K by a base K’ with less 
elements. It should be emphasized, though, that the base K’ is not in general a sub-base 
of K, and is not always of a simpler structure. 
It is possible to determine the characteristic set of any of the systems that were 
proposed to extend a given conditional knowledge base. As an example, we will examine 
the case of a system that offers much similarity with the rational closure. 
5.2. Default ranking through Ze 
In a recent paper [ 31, we showed that when two knowledge bases K and K’ satisfy 
a certain condition of independence, it is possible to extend their union K U K’ through 
the ranking function K@ defined by am = K(m) + d(m), where K and K’ are the 
Z-rankings associated with the rational closures of K and K’. The motivations and the 
detailed presentation of this new ranking system can be found in [ 31, but they are not 
necessary to understand what follows. We begin with a simple example: 
Let K := {b + f,p + b,p + -f} and K’ = {p A b + -f}. These bases are 
independent, and the ranking K@ is as follows: 





After simplification, the characteristic set of K@ is equal, modulo classical equivalence, 
totheset{~pV~bV~f,(~pVb)A(~pV~f),~pA(~bVf),true}. 
TheLM-sequenceofKisKl=7pA(lbVf), K2=(7pVb)A(7pVlf), K3=0; 
the LM-sequence of K’ is Ki = up V -b V -f, K; = 8. If we set Ki = 0 for i 2 3 and 
Kj = 0 for j > 2, we see that W consists of the representatives of the set 
(K; A KY, (K; A Kr) V (K; A Kp), (K; A Kj*) V (K; AK;) V (K; A Kp)}. 
In the general case, the characteristic set of K@ is given by the following: 
Theorem 26. Let K and K’ be two knowledge bases with associated L&l-sequences 
Ki and Kj. Denote by K and K’ the rankings of their rational closures and by h 
and h’ their respective heights. Let K@ be the ranking dejned, for every world m, 
by am = I i- I. Then the characteristic set P of K@ is equal, modulo 
classical equivalence, to the set of all formulae vi+,=,(KT A K,!*), where 1 is any 
integer 1 6 1 < h + h’ and the sets K,?, i > h, and K,!*, j > h’, are empty. 
Proof. It is clear that the height of K@, hence the number of elements of F’, is equal to 
h + h’. Therefore, it is enough to prove that any formula of the form Vi+j=r( KT A KY) is 
an element of p modulo classical equivalence. Let LY be such a formula, and m a world 
that satisfies a. Then there exists two integers i and j, i + j = 1, such that m satisfies 
KT and Kf. We have therefore K(m) < i and d(m) < j. It follows that K@(m) < 1. 
Conversely, let m be a world such that K@(m) < 1. If we denote by i the K-rank 
of m and by j its K/-rank, we see that m satisfies the formula K,? A K$ and one has 
i+ j < 1. We have therefore proven that a world m satisfies the formula Vi+j=,( Ki* A Kj*) 
if and only if K@(m) < 1. It follows that, modulo classical equivalence, the formula 
Vi+,i=, (K,f+ A Ki* 1 is an element of p, and the proof of the theorem is complete. Cl 
6. Conclusion 
The main result of this paper is the link that exists between faithfully representable 
preferential inference relations and inference relations associated with Poole systems 
without constraints. These notions turn out to be equivalent in the case of logically finite 
languages, but this result is not anymore valid for arbitrary propositional languages, and 
we do not know how to characterize, in the general case, those relations that may 
be associated with such a Poole system. Even in the finite case, there still exists some 
fundamental open questions concerning the link between a set of defaults and its induced 
inference relation: we do not know, for instance, what properties satisfies a set D whose 
induce relation bD is rational. We know that if D is linearly ordered through classical 
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implication, its induced inference relation is rational, but this strong condition is clearly 
not a necessary one, and, for the present, we have no way of directly deciding whether 
the order ‘CD induced by a subset D of C is or not modular. 
The results that we have established concerning the determinant associated with a 
preferential inference relations, or the characteristic set associated with a rational relation, 
nevertheless provide an interesting tool for the study of these relations. They show that 
arbitrary orderings on W may be replaced by some more familiar orderings, closely 
related to the inclusion order. It is doubtless that these notions of determinant and 
characteristic set will play a prominent role in any future work concerning the general 
study of falithfully representable inference relations or the dynamics of Poole systems. 
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